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The Economic Inefficiency of Title IX 
Alicia Irons
ABSTRACT.  Title IX of the Educational Amendment Act of 1972 has expanded the
opportunity for women in athletics.  At the same time, it has been detrimental to men’s
athletics.  The elimination of men’s teams is analyzed through a theoretical model and
empirical evidence.  College athletic departments have used an inefficient method to
comply with Title IX because they use the method the NCAA encourages.  The NCAA
needs to reevaluate the methods that it has encouraged and improvements should be made
to Title IX.
I.  Introduction
During the summer of 1999, the United States Women’s Soccer Team
stole the hearts of Americans as they triumphed over China to win the
Women’s World Cup.  The victory was not just for the women on the
soccer field; it was a triumph for all women.  Media coverage of women’s
athletics increased to an all-time high.  This was not just a sports story;
it was a political story.  Politicians and the media quickly associated the
success of the U.S. Women’s Soccer Team with Title IX of the
Educational Amendment of 1972; this law provided equal opportunity for
women in federally funded educational institutions.  Politicians jumped
at the opportunity to show their support for the law that changed the
perception of women’s athletics forever [Gavora, 2002, 11-12]. 
Title IX affected many lives that summer.  The Providence College
baseball team had just completed the most successful season in school
history, but the university had an eleven-point gap between the percentage
of female athletes and female students.  Because of Title IX,
administrators were forced to eliminate this gap or face a lawsuit and/or
federal investigation.  Providence College decided not to add any
women’s teams.  Instead, the men’s baseball program and a total of fifty-
seven male athletes were cut from the athletic program [Gavora, 2002,
14].  This is one of numerous stories about the demolition of men’s
tennis, swimming, baseball, and wrestling teams during the 1990s.    
Title IX of the Education Amendment of 1972 paved the road to
gender equality in many areas.  A provision of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, Title IX states that:
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No person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be
excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be
subject to discrimination under any education program or activity
receiving federal financial assistance [Gavora, 2002, 15].
Title IX did not initially refer to sports.  The first impact of Title IX was
felt by educational providers who were forced to equalize opportunities
for women.  During the past 34 years, the number of women in
specialized fields, such as law and medicine, has skyrocketed.  Recently,
however, women’s athletics have been the focus of debate.  Title IX has
led to monumental strides for women’s athletics, as evidenced by
Olympic and World Cup Triumphs, the organization of a professional
women’s basketball league (WNBA), the organization of a professional
women’s soccer league (WUSA), and the increase in the number of
women participating in youth, college, and professional athletics.  But the
gains came at a cost.  Title IX is under scrutiny for unintended
consequences, specifically the elimination of men’s teams.  A theoretical
model and empirical evidence will show that men’s teams were
eliminated following Title IX implementation.
II. Background
Title IX mirrors the Civil Rights Act of 1964, with a substitution of the
word “sex” in place of “race, color or national origin.”  The original
purpose of Title IX was to break down barriers that restricted women
from participating in federally funded activities.  It covers everything a
federally funded educational institution offers.  Gavora [2002, 15] states
that “if it is touched by federal money and has an ‘educational’ purpose,
it falls under the jurisdiction of Title IX.”  Even though Title IX covers
areas such as counseling, testing, employment, and course offerings, these
areas are rarely involved in Title IX controversy.  It is women’s athletics
that has become synonymous with Title IX [Gavora, 2002, 15-18].  The
law does not specifically refer to women, but rather “the underrepresented
sex.”  It is possible for men to be the underrepresented sex, but it is
typically women [Putnam, 1999, 90].
Before Title IX was passed in June 1972, congressional sponsors
showed reluctance to let the law stand as it was written.  They feared it
would lead to sex quotas in schools.  Therefore, a caveat was added to the
2
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law that would prevent preferential treatment to any sex.  This caveat
states that: 
Nothing [in the law] shall be interpreted to require any
educational institution to grant preferential or disparate treatment
to the members of one sex on account of an imbalance which may
exist with respect to the total number or percentage of persons of
that sex participating in or receiving the benefits of any federally
supported program or activity, in comparison with the total
number or percentage of persons of that sex in any community,
State, section, or other area [Gavora, 2002, 19-20].
In 1972, a Title IX gap was acceptable if it was not created by
discrimination [Gavora, 2002, 20].  
The congressmen who implemented Title IX only laid framework for
increasing educational opportunity for women.  A key factor in the
effectiveness of a law is how the law is interpreted.  Since the caveat
asserts that the overrepresented sex should not be harmed to achieve
equality, the elimination of men’s teams in order to meet Title IX
requirements was an unintended consequence due to misinterpretation. 
Title IX did not contain specific regulations for athletics until July 21,
1975.  A provision required schools to “provide equal athletic opportunity
for members of both sexes” [OCR, 2005, 1].  There are three areas in
which Title IX applies to athletics: financial assistance, “other program
areas,” and equal opportunity [Anderson and Cheslock, 2004, 307].
Access to cheerleaders, band, and facilities are examples of “other
program areas.” The Office for Civil Rights (OCR), a subdivision of the
United States Department of Education, monitors compliance in these
three areas [Putnam, 1999, 91].  
The first athletic regulation required schools to accommodate both
genders with the selection of sports and level of competition.  But athletic
programs did not know how to fulfill these requirements.  On December
11, 1979, the OCR released the Intercollegiate Athletics Policy
Interpretation.  This interpretation asserted that athletic departments,
while accommodating interests of both genders, must provide competitive
team schedules equal to ability level.  In the interpretation, the OCR
released a three-part test to evaluate equal opportunity.  The three-part
test states that a school is in compliance if they achieve ANY of the
following:
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1. The percent of male and female athletes are substantially
proportionate to the percent of male and female students enrolled at
the school (first prong)
2. The school has a history and continuing practice of expanding
participation opportunities for the underrepresented sex (second
prong)
3. The school is fully and effectively accommodating the interests and
abilities of the underrepresented sex (third prong) [OCR, 2005, 2].
The committee did not specify which component was favored, which gave
schools flexibility [OCR, 2005, 2].  A proportionality gap is the
difference between the percentage of female students and the percentage
of female athletes.  The OCR did not give a specific percentage to which
schools must reduce their gap to comply with the first prong, but 3-5%
has held up in courts [Cheslock and Anderson, 2005, 308]. 
In the three-part test, “athlete” does not refer to scholarship athletes
only.  The three-part test only evaluates equal opportunity.  All walk-ons,
partial-scholarship, or full-scholarship athletes are considered during the
three-part test.  A full scholarship athlete is counted the same as a non-
scholarship athlete when determining compliance with the first prong.
Scholarship amounts and equal spending are evaluated separately.    
Title IX did not always apply to athletics.  In 1984, a Supreme Court
ruling made Title IX non-applicable to college athletics.  In the case of
Grove City v. Bell, the Court ruled that Title IX applied only to programs
that received direct federal funding.  Since no college athletic program
received direct federal funding, gender equality in athletics was no longer
enforced by Title IX.  Yet, in 1988, Congress overruled the Supreme
Court’s decision.  Congress passed the Civil Rights Restoration Act
which declares that all athletic programs of schools receiving federal
funds, whether directly to the athletic department or not, are subject to
Title IX [Putnam, 1999, 93].  
In 1994, the Equity in Athletics Disclosure Act (EADA) was passed
that required schools to report statistics on enrollment and athletic
opportunities [Anderson and Cheslock, 2004, 127].  The Act provides the
data necessary to fuel inequality research and lawsuits.  
Even with clarifications from the OCR, athletic departments
demonstrated confusion by their failure to correctly comply with Title IX.
A number of schools had cut men’s programs to comply with the first
prong.  In July 2003, the OCR declared that it opposed cutting men’s
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teams in order to equalize athletic and student gender proportions [OCR,
2005, 2].  Schools that attempted to comply through the third prong did
not have a set standard by which they could prove accommodation of
interests and abilities.  The OCR clarified its position on the third prong
in March 2005.  Schools can conduct a reliable and valid online survey
to determine compliance.  Athletic departments are not in compliance if
there is:
 
1. Unmet interest sufficient to sustain a varsity team
2. Sufficient ability to sustain an intercollegiate team AND
3. Reasonable expectation of intercollegiate competition for
a sport [OCR, 2005, 4].
The OCR provides athletic departments with sample surveys and
directions for conducting the survey to encourage the use of this method
[OCR, 2005, 3-12].  The sample surveys were established by statisticians
within the federal government.  The recommended process for
distribution was via email.  If a student failed to return the survey, he/she
could be considered as not interested in athletic opportunity [NCAA(b),
2005].  These clarifications caused the third prong to replace the first
prong as the most common method for compliance [Cheslock and
Anderson, 2005, 128].
Even though the OCR is in charge of monitoring compliance with
Title IX, schools that fail to comply do not fear the OCR.   The OCR has
never withheld funding or given a school a deadline by which it needs to
eliminate its proportionality gap [Putnam, 1999, 91].  Schools fear
lawsuits or federal investigations.  For a large university, a federal
investigation results in negative media attention, which may lower
financial support and reputation.
III.  Lack of Support for Third-Prong Changes 
The NCAA does not support the March 2005 clarification by the OCR,
which allows internet surveys to evaluate athletic interest.  Many
representatives of the NCAA, including NCAA president Myles Brand,
believe an internet survey can not evaluate athletic interest sufficiently.
The NCAA’s main objection to the clarification is the ability of athletic
departments to count a non-response to an internet survey as non-interest
in athletics [NCAA, 2005(b)].  Stanford University Athletic Director Ted
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Leland noted that freshman students receive several surveys and that a
lack of response does not necessarily imply lack of interest.  He stated
that the new clarification “would be like counting everybody in your
community that didn’t vote as a no vote” [Hosick, 2005].  But, Leland
also believes that this change may have a positive effect at some schools.
On April 28, 2005, the NCAA Executive Council adopted a resolution
that urged the removal of the third-prong clarification by the OCR.  Along
with the resolution, the council urged NCAA members to avoid using this
method for compliance.  The NCAA Executive Committee argued that the
new clarification is inconsistent with the basic principles of Title IX.  The
members of the Executive Committee feel that it puts the burden on
female students, lacks a sufficient monitoring process and will stunt the
growth of women’s athletics [Brown, 2005(a)].  Opponents to this new
method of compliance believe that schools that are “committed” to
equality will shun the new clarification and comply with methods
previous to the March 2005 clarification [Hosick, 2005].
IV.  Gender Statistics in Athletics
Data from the past thirty years show a drastic change in gender
composition in athletics.  The General Accounting Office (GAO) [2001,
4] found that from 1981-1999, male participation in college athletics
increased by only five percent while female participation increased
eighty-one percent.  From 1972-1996, the total number of men’s teams in
Division I declined by 115.  In the same period, the number of women’s
teams increased by 471.  For all divisions in that period, men had a net
increase of 74 teams while women’s teams increased by 1,658 [Sabo,
1998].  In 1999, women’s basketball had a larger number of teams than
any other sport, male or female [Putnum, 1999, 97].
From 1995-2002, Division I institutions had the biggest gains for
women and losses for men.  It was the only division that had a net
decrease in the number of men’s teams and participants [Anderson and
Cheslock, 2004, 308].  Media pressure is higher for Division I institutions
to achieve compliance [Anderson and Cheslock, 2004, 308-309].  The
passage of EADA also made data more readily available.  Since many
universities with high-profile athletic departments have faced Title IX
lawsuits, other large universities decreased their proportionality gap on
their own to avoid facing legal action [Putnam, 1999, 92].   
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Even though statistics show that women’s athletic programs have
expanded more rapidly than men’s athletic programs, they fail to prove
that the decrease in the number of men’s teams was in response to Title
IX.  In order to determine whether a correlation between Title IX and the
cutting of men’s programs exist, one must first understand the decision
techniques of a college athletic program.
V.  The Elimination of Men’s Teams
Title IX has been heavily scrutinized for the elimination of men’s teams.
A theoretical model will show that athletic directors, with a large
proportionality gap and a regulation such as Title IX, will eliminate men’s
athletic programs.  Also, empirical evidence shows that men’s teams were
cut following Title IX implementation.
A.  THEORETICAL MODEL
The response to a regulation such as Title IX will depend on the initial
number of support staff for men’s and women’s programs.  The initial
difference in the allocation of jobs between men’s and women’s sports is
what causes one athletic director to cut men’s teams while another adds
women’s teams.  The following graph demonstrates that concept:
M WMen’s staff size (S ) and women’s staff size (S ) serve as proxy variables
for quantity of programs.  Suppose an athletic department has a budget of
7
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W M E.  Let P  be the price of women’s support staff and P be the price of
M Wmen’s support staff.  For ease of exposition, assume that P  = P .  BC
0represents the budget constraint of the athletic department.  U  represents
the utility maximum subject to the budget constraint.  The indifference
curve has a steep slope.  According to Carroll and Humphreys [2000, 361-
373] the men’s sports staff increases the prestige and revenue of the
athletic department.  The slope of the indifference curve represents the
rate of substitution of women’s staff members for men’s staff members
necessary to hold utility constant.  Typically, men’s sports yield higher
utility to athletic departments than women’s sports.  
Suppose a school starts at point A.  At this point, the athletic
MA WAdepartment has more men’s staff than women’s staff (S  > S ).  Now
assume that a restriction, such as Title IX, is enforced that requires
schools to have a ratio of female to male student athletes equal to R.  This
constraint is represented by the line R.  The line would become steeper as
the ratio increased.  The extra constraint requires schools to operate at
MA MBpoint B.  The quantity of men’s support staff decreases from S to S
WA WBwhile women’s staff increases from S  to S .  Point B is on a lower
1indifference curve, U .  The utility from the additional women’s staff did
not compensate for the eliminated men’s staff.  This school was forced to
equalize down in order to achieve compliance. 
Notice that the reduction in men’s staff depends on the original
composition of staff in the athletic department.  The higher the ratio of
men’s staff to women’s staff, the more men’s staff that will be eliminated
after Title IX implementation.  Schools that have close to equal number
of men’s and women’s staff may be able to raise funds to equalize up.
This would be represented by an increase in E and a shift of the budget
constraint to the right.  The school would be able to achieve higher utility
and therefore have an increase in women’s sports while maintaining
men’s programs.  This is only possible if schools are able to raise money
through donations, ticket sales, or grants.  Schools with a large
proportionality gap and lack of funding would be forced to decrease the
amount of men’s support staff.  The opportunity cost of not increasing
women’s programs and facing lawsuits forces schools who cannot
completely achieve compliance through equalizing up, to cut men’s sports
[Cheslock and Anderson, 2005, 137].  
M WIt was assumed that P  = P .  If this assumption was relaxed, the
budget constraint would rotate.  Typically, men’s sports staff earn higher
M Wwages than women’s sports staff (P  > P ), represented by a rotation of
8
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MBC inward on the S  axis.  The school would start out with less men’s
support staff than the previous example, and the reduction of men’s staff
would not be as drastic following a regulation such as Title IX.  Also, the
budget constraint might not be linear and could be concave.
B.  EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE
Many schools have argued that cutting teams is necessary to meet Title
IX criteria.   Some athletic departments have even cut successful men’s
programs to reduce the number of male athletes [Leeds et al, 2004, 137].
A congressional hearing on Title IX’s effect on men’s collegiate athletics
found that between 1982 and 1996, many men’s programs, other than
basketball and football, were discontinued [Putnam, 1999, 95].  
When a school is forced to comply, it can achieve equality by
“equalizing up” or “equalizing down.”  “Equalizing up” happens when a
school adds women’s teams and/or athletes until it reaches
proportionality.  “Equalizing down” happens when a school cuts men’s
teams and/or athletes to reach compliance [Cheslock and Anderson, 2005,
129].  A study by the GAO [2001, 14-20] found that schools tend to use
both methods to achieve compliance.  
Anderson and Cheslock [2004, 310] found two responses to a
proportionality gap between 1995/1996 and 2001/2002.  The greatest
response was to add female teams and athletes.  The other response was
to drop men’s teams and athletes.  Due to the rising costs of education and
the instability of revenue sources for an athletic department, it is unlikely
that athletic departments can completely adjust proportionality through
the addition of females.  Athletic departments are therefore forced to
decrease the number of male athletes in order to achieve proportionality.
The three divisions of NCAA athletics each use different methods to
comply with Title IX.  Cheslock and Anderson [2005, 132-133] found
that Division I institutions complied faster than the other divisions
between the 1995/1996 and 2001/2002 academic years.  Media pressure
may have increased the rate at which Division I schools complied.  These
schools used a combination of “equalizing up” and “equalizing down” to
achieve compliance quickly.  Division II and III schools primarily used
“equalizing up” methods and took longer to comply.  
McBride et al [1999, 324-328] found a net decrease in the number of
men’s sports following Title IX.  More college athletic departments
offered sports that the NCAA offers for both sexes to women than men.
9
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The total number of sports offered to men, including gender-specific
sports, was 19.  Women were offered 17 sports, but the NCAA had eight
emerging women’s sports that would increase the total number of
women’s sports to 25 [McBride et al, 1999, 328-332].  
“Equalizing up” was attempted by many schools during the 1990s.
Athletic departments rely on donations, grants, and fees as their source of
funds.  Revenue sources depend on the success of the athletic department
and therefore tend to be unstable.  At the same time, tuition costs are
rising.  Some athletic departments may face an unsuccessful athletic
department and rising tuition at the same time.  This is one type of
university that will be forced, due to lack of funds to support an addition
women’s team, to “equalize down.”  
As athletic departments get closer to compliance, the effectiveness of
adding female athletes/teams begins to diminish.  Schools are looking to
comply fast to avoid lawsuits.  Once 46-50% of athletes are women,
dropping male athletes will provide greater gains towards compliance
than adding women [Cheslock and Anderson, 2005, 142-143].  
Schools begin their process of “equalizing down” by reducing the
number of male athletes before cutting entire teams.  Most schools
initially cut walk-ons and non-scholarship athletes.  Non-scholarship
means the marginal cost of providing this athlete the opportunity to
participate in athletics is very low [Kocher, 2005, 150].  A student who
truly wants to be involved and is of low cost compared to a scholarship
athlete is turned away, not because of talent or ability, but rather because
he is a number.  The department is forced to lower utility with little
decrease in cost.  The athletic department is only able to see the
opportunity cost of not complying with Title IX.  The school must comply
or face a possible lawsuit and/or public humiliation.  This may be a risk
athletic directors of high-profile athletic programs are unwilling to take.
VI.  “Equalizing up” through women’s rowing
Many schools that approach compliance through “equalizing up” choose
to add new women’s sports rather than increase the number of women in
established sports.  The number of women’s rowing teams has increased
rapidly since the implementation of Title IX.  Rowing teams can have 90
or more members [Tanner, 2001, 4].  Football programs, with 85
scholarship athletes and around 120 total players, have been criticized for
being “the fat man tipping the canoe of gender equity in sports” [Kocher,
10
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2005, 157].  Some schools have added rowing teams to compensate for
the number of football athletes.  This quick-fix idea for adding female
athletes has become problematic for many athletic departments.  Coaches
have turned to recruiting in dorm rooms and hanging signs on campuses
to fill positions on the squad.  To entice women to try the sport, coaches
offer scholarships.  Recruitment is not the only problem.  Equipment is
costly for schools and suitable rivers on which to train are hard to find in
certain areas of the country [Tanner, 2000, 4-5].  Arizona State
University, located in one the driest areas in the United States, added a
rowing team in 2002.  The team practices on a stretch of water the town
built by flooding a dry gulch [The Wall Street Journal, 1999].
With intense workouts, the dropout rate of women rowers is
extremely high.  Teams start the season with a full roster but end with a
fraction of the original number of members.  Athletic departments can
turn in preseason numbers to count for Title IX compliance, but these
numbers are not representative of participation for the entire year.
Adding a rowing team is a way for schools to artificially inflate the
number of female athletes without having to provide for these athletes the
entire year [Tanner, 2000, 4-5].  
The strongest argument against adding rowing teams is not the
artificial inflation of the number of female athletes.  Worse is the practice
of creating rowing teams with students who lack ability and interest in the
sport.  There are only 34 high school rowing teams in the United States.
By recruiting dorm to dorm or on bathroom walls, athletic departments
are giving women who have never rowed a boat the opportunity to be a
college scholarship athlete [Tanner, 2000, 5].  These same schools are
turning away men who have participated in a sport, such as wrestling and
baseball, since elementary school.  
VII.  The Inefficiency of Proportionality
The first prong of the three-part test for compliance requires schools to
show that the gender proportion of students is mirrored by the gender
proportion of athletes.  Women were only 42% of the student body in
1970.  The low percentage was one of the motivations for instituting Title
IX.  Today, the percentage of female students is 56% and is projected to
grow to 57% by 2013 [NCES, 2006].  Title IX has done exactly what it
was written to accomplish: to increase opportunity for women.  While
opportunity has increased for women, the proportionality gap in athletics
11
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has become harder to reach as women have become a larger percentage
of students.  Athletic departments had trouble allocating resources to
balance out athletic opportunity when women were 42% of the student
body; they now face even harder challenges to allocate 56% of athletic
opportunities to women.  By 2013, schools will have to readjust budgets
and resources to accommodate the one percent increase in the number of
females.  The first prong has required athletic departments to allocate
resources to a moving target.  Constant changes may cause athletic
directors to take the knife to men’s programs once again.  This leaves
many questions unanswered.  Are there enough experienced women
athletes on campuses who want the opportunity that is taken away from
male athletes?  More importantly, since school enrollments have shown
instability, how long will athletic programs have to adjust to meet Title
IX criteria?
Requiring schools to have equal gender proportions in athletics does
not reflect the interests of each gender in athletics.  Males outnumber
females in college intramural sports by three-to-one.  Also, there are
approximately one million more high school male athletes than female
athletes [Kocher, 2005, 148].  According to the Child Trends DataBank
[2003, Table 1], 58.9% of high school senior males and 48% of high
school senior females participate in athletics. The following graph
illustrates interest in high school athletics by gender:
Child Trends DataBank (2003), “Participation in School Athletics,” Child Trend,
http://www.childtrendsdatabank.org/indicators/37SchoolAthletics.cfm.
12
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Notice that males have a higher rate of participation in all age brackets.
Since both intramurals and high school athletics are voluntary and open
to all students, these statistics show that college men have more interest
in athletics than women.  Implementing equality requirements in college
athletics is too late.  Gender equality in college athletics should result
from equal interest and participation in elementary, high school and
intramural athletics.  But the interest is not equal.  It is unreasonable to
expect colleges to undo the socialization process that starts before
elementary school.
Is Title IX discriminating against athletics?  Athletics are the only
extracurricular activities required to exactly mirror their participation
numbers to enrollment characteristics.  Other extracurricular activities are
not forced to allocate a proportionate number of opportunities to its
female and male participants.  Female dominated activities such as art and
dance do not reflect the gender proportions of the university.  Females
were not asked to leave the band because there were not enough men in
the program.  Are these programs discriminating against males?  It is a
stretch to accuse these programs of discrimination; the proportion of
females and males in these departments is determined by interest and
ability, not by quotas.  This leaves the question as to why athletic
departments are not allowed to determine participation based on interest
and ability.  Recall that men have shown more interest in athletics than
women.  Athletic departments, like other departments, should be allowed
to determine opportunity based on level of interest and ability.  The third
prong gives schools this option.  Athletic departments should choose to
follow the third prong of Title IX compliance and avoid the inefficient
first prong.
VIII.  The Purpose of College Athletics
In the late 1800s, athletics were student-run organizations.  As public
interest in athletics grew rapidly, college administrators thought athletics
had become too “visible” to be a student-run organization.  During this
same time period, colleges were searching for financial resources.
College athletics became appealing to presidents and trustees.  “College
presidents believed that a successful football program legitimized their
institution as a major, big-time university” [Gerdy, 1997, 29].  Athletics
were rapidly incorporated into colleges as a way for schools to gain
prestige and visibility, which increased financial support.  At the
beginning of university athletics, there was little mention of character
development and personal benefits of athletic participation.  Sports were
13
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incorporated into higher education as a source of revenue [Gerdy, 1997,
29-30].
Even though athletics are incorporated into colleges, they are part
of the entertainment industry.  Because of revenue control, athletics have
become property of the public rather than universities.  As sports became
a more prominent fixture at college universities, administrators were
forced to justify how college athletics benefited society.  Administrators
argued that athletics provided lessons that one could not learn in a
classroom.  This included teamwork, discipline, and perseverance [Gerdy,
1997, 31].  Athletic programs were initially incorporated into higher
education as a source of revenue; character and personal benefits were as
a justification for adding athletics into the educational environment. 
IX.  Possible Changes
Several committees have attempted to find ways to prevent the
unintended consequences of Title IX.  One recommendation is to ignore
football during the evaluation of Title IX.  According to Rische [1999,
708], this would decrease proportionality gaps and eliminate financial
gaps.  Sigelman and Wahlbeck [1999, 1] found that for schools with
football programs to come close to compliance, football needs to be
exempt from Title IX coverage or rosters need to have a fifty player cap.
The effect of football on women’s athletics has been a hot topic
in debates over Title IX.  Athletic directors and policy makers need to
determine if football contributes to women’s athletics positively or takes
opportunities away from women.  Rische [1999, 706], using data from
1995-1996, found that the more prestigious a Division I-A football team
is, the greater expenditures female athletes receive in absolute terms, but
they receive less in relative terms.  Football makes the proportion of
money spent more unequal.  Yet removing football programs, or reducing
the program, will decrease the amount of money unprofitable women’s
teams receive in absolute terms.  Financial gains from football teams
allow women’s programs and smaller men’s programs to exist.  An
athletic program can also preserve the prestige of the university by
maintaining the football team.  Cutting or reducing a football program
might reduce the extra revenue given to unprofitable teams, as well as the
prestige of the athletic program.  
A substitute for removing football from Title IX coverage is to
implement a player cap on college football.  Currently, Division I-A
football teams offer 85 scholarships and have roughly 120 total
participants.  The National Football League (NFL) only allows teams 45
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players on their active roster per game.  These NFL teams have several
other players but can only activate 45 per game.  Colleges could lower
their proportionality gap by limiting the number of scholarship players to
60.  Since football has the highest percentage of walk-ons, an additional
cap could also be placed on the total number of players [Putnum, 1999,
95].  Supporters of a player cap believe that 60 scholarship players would
be enough to produce a successful football team; the money saved from
the reduction in scholarships could be used to hire a coach that can
achieve the same results with a smaller squad.  A scholarship cap and/or
reduction in football will reduce the proportionality gap of schools that
fail to comply because of football numbers [Sigelman and Wahlbeck,
1999, 1].
One recent recommendation is to eliminate non-traditional
students from school enrollment totals during Title IX review.  Students
over the age of 23 are considered non-traditional students.  Women are
usually the higher percentage of this age bracket.  Non-traditional
students are also less likely to participate in athletics than younger
students.  Eliminating non-traditional students from enrollment totals will
bring schools closer to compliance and generate enrollment numbers that
reflect student-athlete characteristics [Wall Street Journal, 2003].  
Another change that committees have considered is counting only
athletes who were recruited or are on scholarship.  Walk-ons would not
count in Title IX compliance.  Teams would be able to find talented,
virtually cost-free athletes who would fill positions on the athletic team
without violating Title IX.  Both of these changes were recommended to
the Education Secretary in 2003.  There is no deadline for a decision
[Wall Street Journal, 2003]. 
Since the NCAA does not support the use of online surveys to
demonstrate interest and ability, the OCR could implement additional
requirements.  First, the survey should be given to all males and females
to determine the interest and ability of both sexes at each campus.  This
would eliminate the NCAA’s argument of female burden.  The survey
should not be optional.  A school could require students to complete the
survey before they can register for classes.  This would eliminate the
discrepancy of counting a non-response as non-interest.  
X.  Arguments against the Proposed Changes
There have been arguments that the elimination of men’s teams was not
due to Title IX.  People have argued that the increase in the cost of high
profile sports, such as men’s football and basketball, caused athletic
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programs to cut unprofitable sports.  Changes in preferences of athletes
and viewers could also cause less favored sports to be cut [Anderson and
Cheslock, 2004, 308].  Yet as presented earlier, research from unbiased
sources, such as the GAO, have found that men’s sports were eliminated
as a response to Title IX compliance pressure.
In 1972, girls were only 7% of all high school interscholastic
athletes.  This number increased to 37% by 1992 [Putnam, 1999, 95].
The Child Trends DataBank [2003] found that the gap between the
percentage of high school senior female and the percentage of high school
senior male students that participate in athletics decreased gradually
between 1991 and 2003.  The increase in women’s interest in athletics
should be accommodated.  As noted earlier, women also increased their
proportion of college enrollment during this time period.  Even though
Title IX provided women equal opportunity for continuing education,
growing interest in athletics may have caused part of the increase in
women’s participation in college athletics.  Opponents to change feel that
Title IX is necessary to accommodate the recent increase in women’s
interest in athletics.
There are benefits to counting walk-ons in Title IX.  Recall, walk-
ons are the first to be cut from teams to decrease a proportionality gap.
Even though walk-ons are cheap in comparison to scholarship athletes,
reducing the number of walk-ons may increase the competitive balance
of football.  Scholarship players may receive more repetitions during
practice and contact time with coaches [Terry and Ramirez, 2003, 67].
Title IX may benefit team performance by eliminating walk-ons and non-
scholarship athletes. 
Even though athletics were initially incorporated into universities
as a source of revenue, they are non-profit organizations.  Profit
maximization should not be the main goal of athletic departments.  Myles
Brand, the NCAA President, urges people to not view college athletics as
a business.  Education should be the main goal of college athletics, not
revenue maximization [Brown, 2005b].  Sports that generate higher
revenue should not receive preferential treatment to those that do not gain
revenue or run at a deficit.
XI.  Conclusion
Title IX needs change.  Walk-on and non-scholarship athletes should not
be included in Title IX coverage and non-traditional students should not
be included in enrollment numbers.  A provision needs to be added
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regarding football.  A scholarship cap would reduce the proportionality
gap of schools that fail to comply because of football numbers.  An
alternative would be to disregard football during the evaluation of Title
IX.  The OCR should address these possible changes in order to improve
Title IX.
Congressional supporters of Title IX wrote the caveat to Title IX
in fear of sex quotas.  Their fear is now a reality.  Several programs have
cut teams as a quick-fix way to comply with the first prong of the three-
part test for equal opportunity.  Title IX is proof that how courts interpret
and enforce laws counts more than the intention of the lawmakers.  The
interpretation of Title IX has encouraged inefficient methods, such as
“equalizing down,” that were not intended by the original writers.
Many athletic departments achieve compliance with Title IX
through the first prong, which is the method the NCAA encourages.  The
first prong is inefficient.  The theoretical model demonstrates that the first
prong diminishes utility.  Studies have shown that more college men are
interested in athletics than college women.  Research also found that
men’s teams were eliminated following Title IX.  Compliance through the
third prong is more efficient.  The third prong would allow athletic
departments to allocate resources based on interest and ability.  The OCR
should change the online survey method to make it required of all
students and not optional.  With these changes, the NCAA should
encourage the third prong for Title IX compliance.  
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